We look at the problem of revising fuzzy be lief bases, i.e., belief base revision in which both formulas in the base as well as revision input formulas can come attached with vary ing truth-degrees. Working within a very general framework for fuzzy logic which is able to capture certain types of uncertainty calculi as well as truth-functional fuzzy log ics, we show how the idea of rational change from "crisp" base revision, as embodied by the idea of partial meet (base) revision, can be faithfully extended to revising fuzzy belief bases. We present and axiomatise an oper ation of partial meet fuzzy base revision and illustrate how the operation works in several important special instances of the framework.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to rationally change one's beliefs in the face of new information which, possibly, contradicts the currently held beliefs is a basic characteristic of intelligent behaviour. Hence the question of belief re vision is an important question in AI. A very successful framework in which this question is studied is the one due to Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1, 4] , with its operation of partial meet revision. One limitation of this framework is that belief in a for mula is taken as a matter of all or nothing: either the formula is believed or it is not. However, real life knowledge bases may well contain information of a more graded nature. For instance we might want to represent information about vague concepts or uncer tain beliefs. Likewise revision inputs may come with a degree attached. Our aim in this paper is to examine revision in the general setting which allows for such different degrees, while keeping the spirit of AGM.
As a most suitable backdrop in which to work out our ideas we choose a very general framework for fuzzy logic due to Gerla [7] . The basic construct here is that of an abstract fuzzy deduction system, which gener alises Tarski's notion of deductive systems. Roughly, this consists of three basic ingredients: (i) a set L of formulas to describe the world, (ii) a set W of truth-degrees (whose precise interpretation is mostly left open) which may be assigned to the formulas to create fuzzy belief bases, and (iii) a fuzzy deduction op erator D which takes as input a fuzzy base u and re turns another fuzzy base D(u) representing its (fuzzy) conclusions. Sometimes a fourth ingredient is included -a fuzzy semantics M -in which case we speak of an abstract fuzzy logic. When W = {0, 1} we find our selves in the usual "crisp" setting of AGM. The frame work has also been shown capable of capturing sev eral different flavours of uncertain reasoning, including truth-functional logic and certain types of probabilis tic logic.
Within this fuzzy framework, the question of revision we are interested in then takes the following form: Given a fuzzy base u representing our current informa tion, how should we change u to incorporate the new information that the truth-degree of some formula ¢ is at least a for some a E W? In this paper we as sume that the object of change u is an arbitrary fuzzy base which need not be deductively closed, i.e., possi bly u # D(u). Indeed, following the often referred-to distinction made in the belief revision literature (e.g. [13, p. 22 ]), our approach will be foundationalist rather than coherentist. That is, we differentiate between those beliefs which are "basic" or "explicit", ( u) and those which are "merely derived" or "implicit" (i.e., that information in D(u) which goes strictly beyond that contained in u).
The original AGM theory was a theory about how to revise deductively closed sets of formulas, but the more general case of revising arbitrary (crisp) bases has also been studied, notably by Hansson [11, 13] , who axiomatically characterised partial meet base re-VISIOn. We will generalise this operation into partial meet fuzzy base revision and give an axiomatisation. Surprisingly, despite the increase in complexity which admitting many truth-degrees brings, the form of the axiomatisation is roughly the same as in the crisp case. This shows how the principles on which partial meet revision are based really require very little structure. The set of truth-degrees is not even required to be linearly-ordered -any complete, distributive lattice will do.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we set up the framework of abstract fuzzy logic and describe some instances of it, including those related to truth functional fuzzy logics, necessity logic and probability logic. In Sect. 3 we define partial meet fuzzy base re vision operators and give examples to illustrate how these operators work for each instance of the frame work from the previous section. We give the axioma tisation of partial meet fuzzy base revision in Sect. 4 . Finally we conclude in Sect. 5.
2

ABSTRACT FUZZY LOGIC
Our first task is to formally define abstract fuzzy de duction systems. The following definitions are based on [7] . As we said above, we assume L to be the set of all formulas. We take the set W of all possible truth-degrees to be a complete lattice, i.e., we assume W to come equipped with a partial order :Sw on W such that every A � W has both a supremum (or join) sup(A) and an infimum (or meet) inf(A). For a,b E W we write a'Wb for sup({a, b}) and a�b for inf ({a, b}). Often (for instance in our examples) W will be linearly ordered (e.g., the real unit interval). However, in general the only additional assumption we make about W is that it is also distrib utive, i.e., that for all a, b, c E W we have a �(b We) = (a �b) W(a �c), equivalently, aW(b�c) = (aWb)�(aWc).1 We use Ow and 1 w to denote the minimal and maximal elements ofW.
A fuzzy belief base is then just an assignment u : L -t W of truth-degrees to the formulas. Such a piece of information u should be understood as an under con straint, i.e. u(¢) = a means that the truth-degree of ¢ is at least a. We denote the set of all possible fuzzy bases by F(L) . The ordering :Sw induces a "fuzzy
The meaning of this is that v carries more (or more exact) infor mation than u. With this definition it is easy to see that (F(L), �) forms a complete, distributive lattice. Given X � F(L) we shall denote the supremum and 1 For another general approach to modelling uncertainty which likewise relaxes the assumption of linearity see [10] .
infimum of X under � by U X and n X respectively. We write uUv for U{u, v} and unv for n{u, v}. We have the following, for all X� F(L) and ¢ E L,
We use C to denote the strict part of �· The C maximal element of F(L), i.e., the fuzzy base which assigns degree 1 w to every formula, will be denoted by UJ.. The �-minimal element of F(L) , i.e., the fuzzy base which assigns degree Ow to every for mula, will be denoted by u T. For a fuzzy base u we call the set of formulas ¢ for which u( ¢) of Ow the support of u and denote this set by Supp(u). If Supp(u) = {¢1, ... , <Pk} is finite then we may repre sent u as {(¢r/ai), ... , (¢k/ak)} with the interpreta tion that u(¢i) = ai fori= 1, ... , k. We will often use (¢/a) to denote the base { (¢/a)}. Although the sup port of a fuzzy base will typically be finite, the results we describe will be valid for arbitrary u.
The tool for drawing conclusions is the fuzzy deduction operator D :
It is assumed to satisfy analogues of the three basic Ta rski properties:
If D(u) = u1. then we say that u is D-inconsistent, otherwise D-consistent. (We omit the "D-" if it is clear from the context.) A (fuzzy) theory is any fixed point of D. Another property of D, which will be important to us, is logical compactness:
Using an order-theoretical term, the definition says that D is logically compact iff the supremum of ev ery directed family of D-consistent fuzzy bases is itself D-consistent.
We are now able to give the following formal definition: 
It is easy to see that J M satisfies (Monotony), (Idem po tence) and (Reflexivity), and also that a fuzzy base u is 1M -consistent iff modM (u) ,P 0.
is an abstract fuzzy de duction system and M is an abstract fuzzy semantics such that D = JM {i.e., the "completeness theorem" holds).
For any abstract fuzzy deduction system we can always associate a suitable semantics: just take M to be the set of all D-consistent theories.
CONCRETE EXAMPLES
We now give a few example instantiations of the above framework. In each of these we take the set of formulas to be the set of formulas LProp from a propositional language closed under the connectives •, II, V and -t.
We treat () B r.P as an abbreviation for ( () -t ¢) /1 ( r.P -t ()) . We denote the classical logical consequence operator of propositional logic by Cn.
Crisp Deduction Systems
The simplest example of a set of truth-degrees is, of course, the case when W consists of just two elements {0, 1} standing for "false" and "true" respectively. In this case belief bases u are "crisp" , i.e., they corre spond to (characteristic functions of) sets of formulas in LProp, and �' n, U effectively reduce to the usual �� n, U (thus in this case we write the more usual "<P E u" rather than "u(¢) = 1" etc.). In the belief revision literature it is customary to assume that, in addition to (Monotony), (Idempotence) and (Reflex ivity), the deduction operator D satisfies the following three rules:
• If¢ E Cn(u) then r.P E D(u) (Supraclassicality)
We shall call an abstract fuzzy deduction system of the form (LProp, {0, l}, D) where D satisfies the above three properties a crisp deduction system. That D is logically compact follows from the following observa tion, which is easy to verify:
,op be a deduc tion operator which satisfies (Supraclassicality) and {Deduction). Then D satisfies (Compactness) iff D is logically compact in the sense of Definition 1.
Thus we see that, for crisp deduction systems, the property of logical compactness collapses into the usual notion of compactness. Note that for a seman tics here we could take M to consist of all the maximal consistent theories.
Lukasiewicz Fuzzy Logic
In the rest of our examples we take W = [0, 1], i.e., the real unit interval equipped with the usual order ing ::;. Each example will differ only in the choice of a semantics, i.e., '.vhat counts as a "possible world", leading to different types of deduction operator. The first is related to infinitely many-valued Lukasiewicz logic (see, for example [8, 15] ). We take as the seman tics the set Mluk of all truth-functional valuations over LProp in the many-valued Lukasiewicz logic, i.e., the set of functions m :
(Note that here "-t" does not behave as material im plication.) So here the "fuzziness" arises from hav ing worlds with graded properties. We then take D luk = JMiuk" It can be shown [15, Lemma 4.17] that for any given fuzzy base u we have
We also have the following:
) Dluk is logically compact.
For an example of a fuzzy base in this logic let x, y, z be distinct propositional variables and consider:
For an example of an inference we have Dluk (uo) (y) = 0.5, i.e., we infer that the truth-degree of y is at least 0.5. To see this, we have
Hence it suffices to show that 0. Since 0.75 ::;-m(x) this gives us the desired 0.5 S" m(y). Furthermore, we can obtain equality here by choosing moE modM1.k (uo) such that mo(x) = 0.75,mo(Y) = 0.5 and mo(z) = 0.25. Hence Dluk(uo)(y) = 0.5 as required. By similar reasoning we can also show D1uk(uo)(y II z) = min{0.5,0.25} = 0.25, i.e., we infer that the truth-degree of y liz is at least 0.25. So, by ( *) above, we know u0 U ( �(y II z) jb) will be inconsistent for any b > 0.75.
Necessity Logic
Our final two examples show how the framework is also able to capture some types of non-truth-functional belief. The first of these, which corresponds to possi bilistic logic [3] , was described within this framework in [6] . For the semantics we take the set MN of all ne cessity functions over Lp,0p, i.e., the set of functions n : LProp -+ [0, 1) which satisfy, for all 8, r/J E £,
We then take DN = J M w
In this logic the notion of consistency is reducible to classical propositional consistency, in that a fuzzy base u is Dwconsistent iff Supp(u) is Cn-consistent. Also, if u is consistent (and ¢ f. Cn(0)) then DN(u)(¢) may be determined from the values given to those formulas which classically imply ¢ as follows:
For ex ample using the same fuzzy base uo as in the previous example we get DN(uo)(y) = 0.75 and DN(uo)(yllz) = 0.25.
Probability Logic (Lower Envelopes)
Our last example is probabilistic. It is the logic of "lower envelopes" studied in [5] .2 This time we take as a semantics the set Mp of all probability functions over LProp, i.e., all functions p : Lp,0p -+ [0, 1] which satisfy, for all 8, r/J E LProp,
Then every "world" contains complete information of a random phenomena. We then take Dp = JMp· Proposition 4 ( [5, 6]) Dp is logically compact.
2 See also [6] for some more examples of "probability like" logics within this fr amework.
A fuzzy base u then gives a lower constraint for an unknown probability distribution. The deduction op erator Dp(u) improves the initial constraint. It is easy to see (using (P2)) that Dp satisfies the property (*) mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2. A syntactic characterisation of Dp may be found in [6] . For an example of an in ference in this logic consider again the fuzzy base u0 from the previous examples. Then Dp(u0)(y) = 0.5, i.e., we infer that the probability of y is at least 0.5. To see this, we have Dp(uo)(y) = inf{p(y) I p E modM P ( uo)}.
Hence it suffices to show 0.5 S" p(y) for all p E modM P (u0), with equality holding for at least one p. To see this, first note that, using the properties of probability functions, we get p(x) = p(xlly) +p(xll�y) andp(x-+ y) = 1-p(�(x-+ y)) = 1-p(xll�y). Hence we may rewrite the first two constraints on p as 0.75 S" p(x II y) + p(x II �y) and p(x II �y) :<:; 0.25.
The first constraint gives 0.75-p(x II �y) :<:; p(x II y). Then using this with the second constraint gives 0.5 :<:; p(x II y). Since p(x II y) :<:; p(y) for any probability function we then get 0.5 :<:; p(y) as required. We obtain equality by choosing any p0 E modM P ( uo) such that Po(x II �y) = po(�x II �y) = 0.25 and Po(x II y) = 0.5.
Note here that the answer for Dp(uo)(y) coincides with that for D 1ud u0)(y) in the Lukasiewicz example above. In general, though, the two deduction operators will give different results.3 For example it can be shown that, in contrast to Dluk(uo), we get Dp(uo)(yllz) = 0.
FUZZY BASE REVISION
Now we have set up the basic framework we can state formally the question of revision we are interested in:
Question. Assume a fixed abstract fuzzy deduction system (£, W, D) as background. Then given a fuzzy belief base u (representing our current (fuzzy) infor mation) and a pair (¢/a) E L x W (representing the new information that the truth-degree of ¢ is at least a), how should we determine U*(¢/a) which represents the revision of u to consistently incorporate the new information (¢/a)?
The special case of crisp deduction systems is the case which is considered in the AGM framework. The idea there is to decompose the operation into two main steps. First, the initial (crisp) base u is altered if neces sary so as to "make room" for, i.e., become consistent with, the incoming crisp formula ¢. This is achieved by making u deductively weaker (contraction). Here we should adhere to the principle of minimal change, according to which this weakening should be made as "small" as possible. Then the new formula is simply joined on to the result (expansion). In partial meet revision [1, 11] the idea is to focus for the first step on those subsets of u which are consistent with </> and which are maximal with this property. Then, a cer tain number of the elements of this set are somehow selected as the "best" or "most preferred" and then their intersection is taken. The result of this intersec tion is then expanded by</>. We would like to generalise this procedure to apply to an arbitrary abstract fuzzy deduction system. In other words we want to use the following procedure to obtain u * (1>/a):
1. Form the family of maximal fuzzy subsets of u which are consistent with (</>/a). We denote this family by u l_ (</>/a). 4 
Select a subset of these:
l(ul_(</>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a).
Form the meet of the elements of this subset:
n l(ul_ (1>/a)).
Join (</>/a) to the result: u* (</>/a)= (nl( d (</>/a))) u (1>/a).
We now fill in the details of the above sketched proce dure. First we formally define ul_(</>/a):
Note in particular that if u U ( 1> /a) is consistent then ul_(</>/a) = {u}, while if (1>/a) is inconsistent then ul_(</>/a) = 0. We need to know that if (1>/a) is con sistent then u l_ ( 1>/ a) is non-empty. In fact this is the main place where the property of logical compactness of D is required. Under the additional assumption of Zorn's Lemma, it enables us to show the following:
(L). If v � u and v U (</>/a)
is consistent then there exists w E u l_ (</>/a) such that v �w . In the (crisp) belief revision literature the talk is usu ally (and equivalently) of the set of "maximal subsets which fail to imply �¢", which is denoted by u l_ �</>. We prefer the slightly different notation which does not refer to any connectives. of X. It can then be shown that for any such w we have both w E u l_ (</>/a) and v � w.
Proof {Sketch). First consider the set
X = { u' E F(L) I v � u' � u, u' U (</>/a
0
Taking v = UT in the above proposition gives us the desired non-emptiness for ul_(</>/a). We now define selection functions.
A selection function for u is a function I such that for all (</>/a) E Lx W, (i) if ul_(</>/a) f. 0 then 0 f. l(ul_(</>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a), and (ii) if ul_(</>/a) = 0 then l(ul_(</>/a)) = {u}.
Intuitively, selection functions reflect the resistance to change of the items of information in u. Given u E F(L) and a selection function 1 for u we then define a revision operator *"� for u as follows:
Definition 6 Let u E F(L) and let * be an operator for u. Then * is an operator of partial meet fuzzy base revision (for u) iff*=*"� for some selection function 1 for u.
The following proposition is reminiscent of the Harper Identity from crisp revision [4] . It is used later in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proposition 6 Let 1 be a selection function for u. Then u n (u*"� (</>/a)) = n l(ul_(</>/a)).
Proof (Sketch). For the "�" direction first note that un (u*"� (1>/a)) = (u n (nl(ul_(</>/a)))) u (u n (</>/a)) (using the distributivity of F( L)). Hence it suffices to show both u n (nl(ul_(</>/a))) � nl(ul_(</>/a)) and u n (</>/a) � nl(ul_(</>/a)). The former clearly holds. The latter too if (</>/a) is inconsistent (since then 1 ( u l_ ( 1>/ a)) = { u}), while if (</>/a) is consistent it can be shown that un(<j>fa) � u' for all u' E ul_(</>/a), which then suffices (since l(ul_(<f>/a)) s:; ul_(</>/a) ). For the";;)" direction we need both n l(ul_ (1>/a)) � u and nl(u l_ (</>/a)) � (nl( d (</>/a))) u (</>/a). The latter clearly holds, while for the former we have l(ul_(</>/a)) f. 0 and so, given u' E l(ul_(</>/a)), we haven l(ul_ (1>/a)) � u' � u as required (since u' � u by definition of ul_ (</>/a)).
Thus un ( u*"� (1>/ a)) may be equated with the result of "contracting" u to make room for the new item (</>/a).
EXAMPLES
Let us give an example of partial meet fuzzy base re vision "in action" for each of the instantiations of the framework we gave in Sect. 2.1.
Crisp Deduction Systems
For crisp deduction systems the operation reduces to the usual partial meet base revision from [11] . For example suppose u = {x,x -t y,z} and suppose we receive the new information �(y 1\ z) (it is understood that all the stated formulas have degree 1). Then we get ul.(�(y /\z)) = {{x,x -t y},{x,z},{x -t y,z}}.
Suppose our selection function 1 selects the first two subsets above: 1(ul. (�(y 1\z)) = { {x, x -t y }, {x, z} }. Then we get u *"� �(y 1\ z) = (nl(ul. (�(y 1\ z) )) u { �(y 1\ z)} = {x, �(y 1\ z)}.
Lukasiewicz Fuzzy Logic
Suppose u0 is given as in Sect. 2.1.2, i.e., uo = {(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.75), (z/0.25)}. Then suppose we receive the new information (�(y 1\z)/1), i.e., it is def initely not the case that y and z are true together. We know from the remark at the end of Sect. 2.1.2 that uo is inconsistent with this new information. In or der to make u0 consistent with (�(y 1\ z)/1) we need to modify it so that Dluk(u0)(y 1\ z) = 0. This can be achieved either by holding the truth-degrees of x and x -t y fixed while lowering that of z to 0, or by holding the truth-degree of z fixed and lowering that of either x or x -t y (or both) just enough to ensure D luk(uo)(y) = 0. Precisely, we can show that Suppose we prefer to keep the information item (x/0.75), and that this is reflected by applying the selection function
Then, using u * as shorthand for uo *"� ( � (y 1\ z) /1), we have u*(�(y 1\ z)) = 1, while fore f. �(y 1\ z) we have
Hence, as our final result we get u0 * "� (�(y 1\ z)/1) = {(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.25), HY 1\ z)/1)}.
Necessity Logic
Let uo be as in the previous example and suppose we get the new information (�(y 1\ z)/0.25). Then, since Supp(uo U HY 1\ z)/0.25)) = {x, x -t y, z, �(y 1\ z)} is en-inconsistent we know UQ U ( �(y 1\ Hence so far this doesn't look much different from the case of crisp deduction systems. The only dif ference is that now not all the formulas have de gree 1. We have the option of using this extra ex pressiveness to actually help define a selection func tion, perhaps according to a principle that formu las with greater degrees should be kept whenever possible. Indeed this is the approach usually taken in works on belief revision within possibility theory such as [2] . For instance in the above example we could prefer to throw out the information item with the lowest degree, i.e., (z/0.25). This would be re flected by using a selection function for u0 such that: l(uo l. ( �(y 1\ z) /0.25)) = { { (xfO. 75), (x -t y /0. 75)}} Then nh (uo j_ HY 1\ z)/0.25))) = l (uo j_ HY 1\ z)/0.25)) and so u0 * "� (�(y 1\ z)/0.25) = {(x/0.75), (x -t y/0.75), (�(y 1\ z)/0.25)}. 5 We remark, however, that there is nothing to stop us from defining 1 indepen dently of the degrees. we are not willing to choose any subset of u0 in which the probability of x falls below 0.6. Then, using u* now as shorthand for u0 * "� ( �y /0. 75) we have u* ( �y) = 0. 75, while for 5 For a related approach see [16] . 6 In fact the question of the precise nature of the rela tionship between degrees of confidence (i.e., truth-degrees for us) and degree of resistance to change is one of the open philosophical problems in belief revision recently posed by Hansson [12] . 
4
CHARACTERISING PARTIAL
MEET FUZZY BASE REVISION
In this section we axiomatically characterise the class of partial meet fuzzy base revision operators. It turns out that the class is characterised by the following five postulates, each of which generalises a postulate from the corresponding axiomatisation from the crisp case [11] . On the right we list the usual names. (Uniformity) (Fl) says that the revision is successful, i.e., that after revision by (¢/a), the formula ¢ is assigned a truth degree of at least a. (F2) requires the result of revision to be consistent, provided the input is itself consistent.
(F3) says that the revised base should not contain more information than that obtained by simply joining the original base with the new information. (F4) seeks to minimise unnecessary loss of information. Roughly, it expresses that if, for every consistent fuzzy base u' lying between u *(¢/a) and u U (¢/a), it is possible to raise the truth-degree of e from u'(B) to b without incurring inconsistency, then there is no reason for the revised truth-degree of e to fall below b. Finally for (F5), first note that un(u*(<l>/a)) can be understood as that information in u which is retained in u* (¢/a). Hence (F5) says that if two different inputs are con sistent with precisely the same fuzzy subsets of u then they remove the same information from u. We now give the main result of the paper, which generalises the characterisation given in [11] for crisp deduction systems. Theorem 1 Let u E F(L) and* be an operator for u. Then * is an operator of partial meet fuzzy base revision for u iff* satisfies (Fl)-(F5).
Remarks on the proof. The proof is based on that of the special crisp case in [11] . The main difficulty arises from the unavailability in our more general case of the (Deduction) property. Also, it turns out that the only properties of D which are needed are logical compact ness and the following weakening of (Monotony):
If v is consistent and u � v then u is consistent.
This last remark also applies to propositions 5 and 6.7
The next proposition gives us some more rules which can be derived from (Fl )-(F5).
Proposition 7 Let u E F(L) and * be an operator for u which satisfies (Fl)-(F5). Then* also satisfies the following properties:
(F6) is the "vacuity" property which says that if the new information (¢/a) is consistent with the current information u, then the new base is formed by sim ply adding (</>/a) to u. As a consequence of this we get (F7), which says that if u is consistent and ¢ is al ready explicitly assigned a truth-degree in u of at least a then revising by (¢/a) leaves the base unchanged. (F8) says that if u(¢) :Sw a then ¢ is assigned a truth-degree in the new base of precisely a. For the common case when W is linearly ordered, (F7) and (F8) together give:
We remark, however, that it can be shown partial meet fuzzy base revision operators do not satisfy this prop erty in general. (F9) states that if the new informa tion is inconsistent then the new base is again formed by just adding it to the current information. Finally, (FlO) says that revising by information which is "log ically equivalent" removes the same information from u. The proof of Prop. 7 requires only the same prop erties of D as Theorem 1, with one small exception: the derivation of (FlO) requires all three of the (gen eralised) Tarski properties.
7For the crisp case, it is already noticed in [14, Sect. 3] that the only properties required of D are (Compactness) and (Monotony) (which, in the presence of (Deduction), is actually equivalent to its above weakening).
CONCLUSION
We have considered the question of fuzzy belief base re vision within Gerla's general framework for fuzzy logic.
We have defined and axiomatised the operation of par tial meet fuzzy base revision, which generalises the op eration of partial meet base revision from the usual crisp case. The fact that we obtained this axiomati sation with such relatively weak restrictions shows on the one hand how the ideas of rational belief change are general enough to be applied to reasoning under vagueness or uncertainty. On the other hand, it con firms that the types of fuzzy systems covered by our abstract setting are indeed appropriate for modelling the human capacity of making conclusions from uncer tain or vague premises. We have given some examples which show how the operation works in some specific instances of the framework, including those related to
Lukasiewicz fuzzy logic and probability logic.
In this paper the question of base revision has been investigated from a very high position on the abstrac tion ladder, with only a handful of properties assumed of the basic primitives. We have shown that it is nev ertheless possible to formulate basic properties of base revision operators. We would like to think of (F1)� (F5) as the absolute minimal core properties which any base revision operator should satisfy. However, as we move down the abstraction ladder, we fully ex pect to be able to say more. Furthermore, as the dif ferences between the various instantiations of our ab stract framework then come into focus, such as those between truth-functional logic and uncertainty calculi (e.g. probability logic), we also expect to be able to an semantics. Finally we would also like to study theory revision in this framework.
